Summary of JOIE Article by Kaleb Demerew West Texas A&M University, USA, Samson Faboye, University of Johannesburg, South Africa and Sampson Edodi, University of Abuja, Nigeria. The full article is available on the JOIE website.
Federalism has long been proposed as a governance solution for multiethnic African states struggling with identity-based conflict. Yet, despite constitutional adoptions of federal and quasi-federal structures, African states continue to experience persistent ethnic tensions and governance failures. This paper argues that the shortcomings of African federal systems stem from an inadequate institutional design that conflates federalism with decentralization while neglecting the broader institutional principles of polycentric governance. By developing a polycentric federalism framework, the authors outline three key institutional parameters: administrative devolution, peaceful intergovernmental competition, and individual choice of governance structures. These are necessary components of institutional design for managing diversity effectively through federalism. Applying this framework to case studies of Nigeria and Ethiopia, the paper demonstrates how federal design choices have hindered rather than facilitated polycentric approaches. It also offers policy recommendations for institutional reform.
Addressing The Conceptual Gap through the Framework of Polycentric Federalism
The authors argue that decentralization, or devolution, is not enough to secure the conflict-alleviation benefits of federalism. Federal systems must also facilitate peaceful competition between governance units and provide individuals with meaningful choices over which governance structures they operate under. The absence of these conditions explains why African federalism has largely failed to deliver its expected benefits.
Drawing from Ostrom’s theory of polycentricity, the authors propose a conceptual reconfiguration of federalism that emphasizes autonomy in decision-making at lower levels, intergovernmental competition, and individual choice. The analysis uses a paired comparison approach to assess the institutional designs of Nigeria and Ethiopia, illustrating how both countries’ federal systems fail to approximate the polycentric ideal. Nigeria and Ethiopia provide compelling case studies due to their divergent federal models, a geographic-based design in Nigeria versus an ethnofederal design in Ethiopia. Yet, both exhibit similar governance failures, including elite domination, resource monopolization, and ethnicity-based tensions and conflict.
Administrative Devolution
Devolution is a fundamental criterion for polycentric federalism. In theory, both Nigeria and Ethiopia provide constitutional recognition of regional autonomy. However, in practice, centralized control undermines regional and local governance. In Nigeria, the 1999 Constitution establishes three tiers of government—national, state, and local—yet central government control over resources and appointments weakens true administrative devolution. Patronage politics incentivize regional elites to align with the federal government rather than act independently.
In Ethiopia, the pre-2018 EPRDF (Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front) regime maintained strict centralized control through democratic centralism, limiting regional policy autonomy. Despite formal provisions for ethnic self-rule, federal government intervention in regional affairs, particularly in Oromia and Benishangul-Gumuz, fueled ethnonationalist grievances. The transition to Prosperity Party rule in 2018 increased administrative devolution, yet growing centralization under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and violent inter-regional conflicts counteracted this progress, undermining the other two parameters of polycentric federalism.
Peaceful Intergovernmental Competition
A core principle of polycentric federalism is the presence of structured, peaceful competition between governance units. Nigeria and Ethiopia lack this element due to institutional designs that promote central monopolies and exacerbate ethnic divisions. Nigeria’s Federal Character Principle was intended to balance representation among ethnic groups but has instead institutionalized ethnic quotas that discourage merit-based governance. Rather than fostering inter-state competition, this system entrenches regional rivalries and discrimination.
Ethiopia’s ethnofederal model theoretically allows for inter-regional autonomy, but in practice, the system has incentivized violent rather than peaceful competition. Under the EPRDF, the dominance of the Tigrayan ethnic party over the federal system marginalized other ethnic groups, suppressing genuine inter-regional competition. After 2018, regional security forces expanded their autonomy, leading to armed conflicts in Tigray, Amhara, and Oromia. The result has been escalating ethnic violence rather than constructive governance competition.
Individual Choice of Governance Structures
The most defining feature of polycentric federalism is the ability of individuals to choose among competing governance structures. Nigeria’s legal framework, at least on paper, allows for more individual mobility between regions compared to Ethiopia. However, in practice, barriers to participation exist due to indigeneity laws that restrict residency-based rights. The federal structure offers theoretical alternatives, but centralization and ethnic patronage limit their real effectiveness.
Ethiopia’s federal model outrightly denies individuals the right to choose their governance structure, as the system is based on ethnic identity. Ethnically designated regions restrict political participation to dominant ethnic groups, making it difficult for minorities to operate freely in their own country. The constitutional provision for secession further rigidifies identity-based governance, undermining individual agency and exacerbating inter-group hostility. The Prosperity Party’s reforms have not fundamentally changed these structural limitations, and displacement due to ethnic conflicts has only worsened the situation.
Discussion and Policy Implications
Polycentric federalism offers a more robust framework for analyzing why federalism has failed to manage ethnic conflict in Africa. By focusing on institutional design, rather than just decentralization, this approach provides a clearer pathway for federalism to function as a viable governance model. Without addressing these core structural flaws, Nigeria and Ethiopia’s federal systems will continue to fall short of their intended goals, reinforcing conflict rather than alleviating it.
Both Nigeria and Ethiopia fail to meet the parameters of polycentric federalism. Nigeria scores marginally better on administrative devolution and individual choice, while Ethiopia has witnessed increased decentralization since 2018 but has deteriorated on competition and individual agency. Overall, neither system achieves the necessary conditions for federalism to function as a mechanism for managing ethnic diversity.
To realign these federal structures with polycentric governance principles, the authors propose several policy interventions:
- Nigeria: Strengthen fiscal autonomy for local governments, reform the Federal Character Principle to allow for merit-based governance, and explore informal governance models from pre-colonial political systems that facilitated localized autonomy.
- Ethiopia: Transition away from ethnofederalism by introducing non-territorial autonomy for ethnic groups, separate party politics from formal state structures, establish non-ethnic urban centers for balance, and promote institutional flexibility that provides individuals with greater choice in alternating governance structures.